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Age at Migration and Social Integration
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The paper studies childhood migrants and examines how age at migration affects their 
ensuing integration at the residential market, the labor market, and the marriage market. We 
use population-wide Swedish data and compare outcomes as adults among siblings arriving 
at different ages in order to ensure that the results can be given a causal interpretation. The 
results show that the children who arrived at a higher age had substantially lower shares of 
natives among their neighbors, coworkers and spouses as adults. The effects are mostly 
driven by higher exposure to immigrants of similar ethnic origin, in particular at the marriage 
market. We also find some effects on educational attainment, employment rates and wages, 
although these effects are much more limited in magnitude. We also analyze children of 
migrants and show that parents’ time in the host country before child birth matters, which 
implies that the outcomes of the social integration process are inherited. Inherited integration 
has a particularly strong impact on the marriage patterns of females. 
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1  Introduction 
This paper concerns the social and economic integration of youths with immigrant 
background. This issue has received increasing political attention since many Western 
countries experience rapid changes in the demographic composition alongside a grow-
ing fear that socioeconomic disparities between ethnic groups may be persistent over 
generations. However, although there is a large literature describing patterns of ethnic 
segregation and economic differences between groups, researchers have paid surpri-
singly little attention to the situation for childhood migrants and the children of immi-
grants (Zhou, 1997).  
This paper studies how age at migration affects social integration among these 
groups. Social integration is a broad phenomenon which captures educational and eco-
nomic outcomes as well as more subtle dimensions such as the composition of people 
with whom immigrants live, work, and form families (see e.g. Zhou 1997 and 
Waldinger & Feliciano 2004). Our analysis builds on a Swedish population-wide data 
set which allows us to analyze the integration on three different social arenas: the 
residential market (neighbors), the marriage market (spouses) and the labor market (col-
leagues), all of which are areas which have never previously been studied in relation to 
the effects of age of migration. In addition we analyze the impact of age at migration on 
education, employment and wages.  
In fact, to the best of our knowledge, no previous study has studied all these markets 
within a unified empirical framework. A second innovation is that we are able to study 
both childhood immigrants and children of migrants. The latter group allows us isolate 
the effects of parental time in the host country, and we are therefore able to study 
whether integration is inherited. A third advantage is that parent-child links in the data 
allow us to exploit the variation between siblings to control for all family-specific fac-
tors which potentially affect the outcomes of the immigrant children. Thus, we are able 
to handle the impact of unobserved family characteristics which may be correlated with 
children’s age at migration. 
A vast number of studies have depicted assimilation patterns among adult immi-
grants in Europe and the US. By and large, the results suggest that even though immi-
2  Age at migration and social integration  grants’ positions improve with years since migration the average immigrant will never 
catch up with the average native worker (see e.g. Borjas 1999).
1 As described in the 
next section, the literature on segregation contains ample evidence that ethnic and im-
migrant segregation is substantial in all the markets under study here and our purpose is 
to provide new evidence on the determinants of the individual choices which shape 
these societal patterns. It should be noted that it has proven difficult to isolate causal ef-
fects of segregation on economic outcomes, partly due to methodological difficulties. 
Furthermore it has been argued that segregation is not necessarily bad unless it prevents 
immigrants from taking full part in the host-society’s economic and political life (e.g. 
Ghaffar-Kucher 2006). However, given the magnitude of the sorting patterns, providing 
a better understanding of the underlying processes is an interesting topic in its own 
right. 
We study individuals who were born in 1960–1971 and who immigrated to Sweden 
before age 15, or whose parents arrived in Sweden 10 years or less before they were 
born. Although the time period covers some initial cohorts of refugees and family reuni-
fication migrants from more distant countries, it precedes the large waves of refugees in 
the late 1980s and 1990s for which economic integration has proven particularly prob-
lematic. The period we study is instead one of substantial labor migration, often from 
neighboring countries, and the adult migrants of the time are typically considered suc-
cessful in terms of economic assimilation.  
Our analysis reveals a substantial impact of age at migration on social integration in 
early adulthood (at age 31–34). The effects are strong: arriving five years later increases 
the fraction of immigrants at the workplace and neighborhood by about 2 percentage 
points each whereas the probability of having an immigrant spouse is increased by 12 
percentage points. For males, employment and wages are also significantly affected, 
whereas the impact on marriage formation is more pronounced for women. We also 
show that effects on the probability of finding a spouse from the same region of origin 
                                                 
 
1  These studies typically assume integration to be a continuous and linear process. But this may not be true for 
childhood migrants and children of immigrants. According to e.g. Cunha et al (2007), investments at early ages are 
particularly important since they influence also later investments (“skill begets skill”); in other words the integration 
process in terms of e.g. language acquisition may not be linear. Theory also suggests that time spent in the host 
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and workplace markets also are driven by increased exposure to other groups of immi-
grants. When studying Swedish-born children of migrants we find that the fraction of 
immigrant neighbors, coworkers, and spouses are lower the more time the parent had 
spent in Sweden before the child’s birth.   
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 first gives a general back-
ground. Section 3 describes the data and section 4 presents some descriptive statistics. 
Section 5 describes the empirical setup, section 6 presents the results, and section 7 
gives some concluding remarks. 
2  Background 
2.1  Age at migration and economic outcomes 
Most empirical studies of child and adolescent migrants have focused on the potential 
importance of age at migration as a determinant on schooling outcomes. This aspect is 
potentially important, in particular since most schooling systems contain age-related 
checkpoints; children generally leave compulsory and secondary school at certain ages, 
and the grades received at these stages are an important determinant of which type of 
higher education they are able to pursue. Performing at these checkpoints may be diffi-
cult for immigrants who arrive late due to language problems or other temporary prob-
lems during the first few years after arrival. Failures at the checkpoints may have nega-
tive effects that are difficult to repair later in life.  
 Recent empirical studies support the hypothesis that immigrants who arrive later 
perform worse at school. Cortes (2006) finds that the test score gaps between first and 
second generation immigrants narrow the longer the first generation have been in the 
US. Gonzalez (2003) finds that on average, individuals arriving to the US in early 
childhood will have more education than those arriving in their teens. This pattern, 
however, varies across region of origin, with the negative association being stronger for 
                                                                                                                                               
country before e.g. entering the labor market or making marital decisions may be a factor of importance for social 
integration. See Zhou (2007) for references to theories on the social assimilation of immigrants. 
4  Age at migration and social integration  Mexican and European immigrants. Van Ours and Veenman (2006) present similar 
findings for the Netherlands, showing that the level of education attained is lower for 
those who has immigrated at higher ages, but that the borderline age varies depending 
on region of origin.
2 Schaafsma & Sweetman (2001) find an association between entry 
age and earnings in Canada and point out that the potential role of age at migration has 
typically been downplayed in studies of earnings assimilation. Bleakley & Chin (2008) 
conclude that English proficiency at adulthood declines with age at arrival (more 
sharply after age 9), which in turn affects educational performance in the second gener-
ation (i.e. the children of childhood migrants). 
Böhlmark (2008) uses an approach similar to ours and studies the impact of age at 
immigration on Swedish compulsory school grades. The results show that age at immi-
gration has a strong negative impact on school performance, especially among those ar-
riving at age 9 and older. Cross-section regressions give results quite similar to the fam-
ily fixed effects specifications. In contrast to the substantial differences in early perfor-
mance, Böhlmark (2009) finds that childhood immigrants tend to recover in terms of 
long-term educational achievement. However, age at immigration was nevertheless 
found to have a strong negative effect on male earnings. 
While our primary focus is on social integration, there is some considerable value-
added also for the economic outcome measures relative to Böhlmark (2008, 2009): we 
study also the importance of parental time in Sweden, measure outcomes at somewhat 
higher ages (which may be important to capture permanent differences), use family 
fixed effects for all outcomes, and have a much larger sample. It is also worth noting 
that we analyze a different wave of immigration, i.e., children of labor immigrants (the 
samples used in Böhlmark (2008, 2009) consist to a much larger extent of the children 
of refugees). 
                                                 
2 See Kao & Tienda (1995), Riphahn (2001), and Chiswick & DebBurman (2004) for further results. 
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Despite the vast literature on segregation between immigrants and natives
3 it is striking 
how little is known about the role of age at migration for the ensuing integration later in 
life. Here we present a brief discussion on segregation theory and the potential links to 
age at migration. 
Segregation in the social dimensions could be driven by preferences. Minority (or 
majority) individuals may prefer to live and work with peers, and in the marriage mar-
ket there is little doubt that cultural factors influence preferences and thereby the 
choices of partners.
4 While it is certainly hard to determine at which age preferences are 
formed, it seems reasonable that feelings of belonging to the source country’s culture 
and people may be stronger for those migrating at older ages. Parental preferences may 
also change with time in the host country and this may in turn influence the preferences 
of the children. There is a large psychological literature looking at parental influences 
on marriage decisions (beginning with Freud, see e.g. Freud (1950)). Sociological and 
economic studies have considered how parental attitudes and behavior affect the labor 
market outcomes of the offspring and their spouses (Thornton, et al 1983, Fernandez et 
al 2004). Recent theoretical work also studies the mechanisms behind cultural transmis-
sion across generations (Bisin & Verdier 2001), and how this interacts with other influ-
ences on identity formation (Saez-Marti & Sjögren 2008). 
At least in the labor market, efficiency is likely to be of some importance. If e.g. a 
common language makes it is easier to communicate and work together (Lazear 1999, 
den Butter et al 2004), we would expect some segregation based on region of origin. If 
there are systematic differences in skills across demographic groups (not necessarily in 
levels but in fields), workplace segregation is likely to occur. Social networks are im-
portant for finding work (Ioannides and Loury, 2004), and to the extent that contacts are 
more common within groups than across groups, this could explain labor market segre-
                                                 
 
3 A description of residential segregation is provided by Iceland et al (2002), whereas Hellerstein & Neumark (2008) 
discuss workplace segregation, and Qian & Lichter (2001) and Kalmijn (1998) show evidence on intermarriage and 
homogamy. Corresponding Swedish evidence can be found in Bråmå (2006), Åslund & Skans (2009) and Dribe & 
Lundh (2008). 
4 When preferences are against interacting with a certain minority rather than for interacting with peers, 
discrimination and exclusion occurs. Landlords or employers may consciously deter job-applicants belonging to 
6  Age at migration and social integration  gation. Similarly, some studies argue that employers use ethnic networks to reduce the 
risk in hirings (Bailey and Waldinger 1991). In the residential market, living close to 
other immigrants or ethnic peers may decrease e.g. transportation costs associated with 
social life and activities in associations. In the marriage market, it may be considered ef-
ficient to share language and background. On this market it is particularly clear that 
there is no clear line separating efficiency from preferences. This is especially true since 
marriages may serve purposes harder to define in terms of individual utility; e.g. pre-
serving a group’s cultural characteristics (Kalmijn 1998; Bisin & Verdier 2000). 
Segregation can also be due to more general social patterns of exclusion and seg-
mentation. Naturally, negative consequences are more likely to occur if segregation is 
not by choice but by exclusion. Theories of labor market segmentation argue that certain 
groups are concentrated to unattractive jobs and have poor chances of moving on to 
better ones because discrimination or lack of suitable networks prevents them from ac-
cessing other parts of the labor market. In the residential markets, a similar line of rea-
soning implies that minority groups may be excluded from parts of the housing market 
and therefore concentrated to less attractive housing with limited chances of upward 
mobility. See e.g. Ovadia (2003) for a further discussion on theory and empirical find-
ings. 
A topic particularly relevant in a study of minority youth is the formation of opposi-
tional cultures. Some scholars have suggested that minority youths may deliberately 
resist adaptation of majority behavior and therefore also reject the goal of upward social 
mobility (see e.g. Fordham & Ogbu 1986). More recently this “acting white” phenome-
non has also been brought into economics (Austen-Smith & Fryer 2005). While one 
could argue that segregated environments could be a breeding-ground for such behavior, 
Bisin et al (2006) and Fryer & Torelli (2005) report that strong cultural identities are 
more likely to be observed in mixed neighborhoods compared to more homogeneous 
environments. Even though it is very hard to establish a causal link between identities 
and economic outcomes, there is evidence on an association; Clark & Drinkwater 
                                                                                                                                               
certain groups. Similarly, parents may try to prevent their children from marrying individuals belonging to specific 
groups. 
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employment rates than those who prefer integrated areas. 
2.3  Segregation and economic outcomes 
Even though it is notoriously hard to pin down causal effects, many studies do indeed 
find a link between segregation and economic outcomes. The relationship between resi-
dential segregation and economic outcomes is by far the most studied dimension; 
Durlauf (2004) and Ellen et al (2002) review the literature. Gullberg (2002) summarizes 
Swedish evidence. Ihlanfeldt (2006) and Gobillon et al (2007) discuss how residential 
segregation is related to labor market performance through so-called spatial mismatch, 
i.e. minorities are negatively affected by living separated from job opportunities. Other 
studies on the effects of ethnic residential concentration include Cutler & Glaeser 
(1997) for the US, and Edin et al (2003) for Sweden. The effects of labor market segre-
gation are less well documented. Bayard et al (1999) and Åslund & Skans (2009) report 
a negative association between workplace segregation and wages. For the marriage 
market, Meng & Gregory (2005) find that intermarriage affects immigrant earnings as-
similation. 
3  Data 
We base our analysis on population-wide register data from the IFAU database which 
builds on registers originally collected by Statistics Sweden. The main original sources 
are a residential register (RTB), a linked employer-employee database (RAMS), and an 
intergenerational register capturing links between parents and children (Flergenerations-
registret) as well as information on marital status from registers in the LOUISE data-
base. All these registers are linked by means of a personal identification number used by 
all Swedish residents in contacts with employers and government agencies.  
The database contains information on all individuals aged 16–65 living in Sweden at 
some point between 1985 and 2005. For these individuals we can identify region of 
8  Age at migration and social integration  birth, region of birth of each of the parents, year of immigration,
5 gender, and year of 
birth. Furthermore, for each year we have information on place of residence, education, 
earnings, and an exhaustive list of employers (see more below). The intergenerational 
register also contains an indicator of each child birth, the identity of the father and the 
mother, and the order of the child for each parent. 
3.1  Data restrictions  
Our sample contains all who were born between 1960 and 1971 that either immigrated 
before age 15 or whose parents immigrated 10 years or less before they were born. 
Thus, we measure age of immigration in the [-10, 14] interval and the included years of 
immigration span from 1950 to 1985. We concentrate on youths who arrived before age 
15 to make sure that none of the subjects have entered the labor market or the marriage 
market before migrating. We only include cases where none of the parents were born in 
Sweden
6 and base age at immigration on the year when the mother arrived in order to 
pin down the timing for children born in Sweden. We define family fixed effects using 
the identity of the mother.  We measure outcomes as averages of observations at ages 
31–34; using several years to decrease the number of missing values for wages and 
composition of coworkers.  
3.2  Exposure 
Our main measure of integration/segregation is immigrant exposure defined as the frac-
tion of others (within the neighborhood, the workplace or the marriage) that are foreign-
born, i.e. the fraction of neighbours, co-workers and spouses who are immigrants. Note 
that the individual him-/herself is excluded when calculating the measure to avoid de-
pendence on the size of the unit of interaction (e.g. the size of the workplace).
7 We only 
calculate how exposed the youths are to individuals actually born outside of Sweden 
although our sample also includes Sweden-born children with parents who are recent 
immigrants. The reason is that we lack data on where parents of older individuals were 
                                                 
5 We only have access to the last year of immigration during our sample period (1985–2005) and we use, for each 
individual, the first recorded “last year of immigration”, i.e. for most individuals the year recorded in the 1985-file. 
6 Individuals where the mother is foreign-born and father data are missing are also included. 
7 See Åslund and Skans (2008) for a discussion of the use of this measure in comparison to other potential 
segregation measures, and for references to the vast methodological literature on the measurement of segregation. 
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Although this choice reduces the level of measured exposure, it is unlikely to affect the 
time patterns we are interested in. For visibility we define exposure in percent rather 
than fractions. 
We use information about the mother’s place of birth as a measure of specific origin. 
We use this information to separately analyze the exposure to immigrants of similar ori-
gin (“own group”) and immigrants of other origin (“other group”). The underlying in-
formation is grouped into 26 regions by Statistics Sweden for confidentiality reasons. 
The definitions of the regions can be found in the appendix.  
3.3  The residential market 
When analyzing residential integration we use data derived from the address where each 
individual is registered on the 31
st of December each year. This information is aggre-
gated into neighborhoods referred to as SAMS (Small Area Market Statistics) areas by 
Statistics Sweden. These neighborhoods are defined so as to cover “homogenous resi-
dential areas”.
8 In total there are 9,230 SAMS areas in Sweden, which means that ap-
proximately 1,000 individuals inhabit the average neighborhood. Our analysis only use 
data on neighbors aged 16-64. 
3.4  The labor market 
We use three outcomes directly related to the labor market: (i) immigrant exposure at 
the workplace (the fraction of co-workers who are foreign-born, again excluding the 
subject him-/herself); (ii) employment; (iii) wages. The outcome variables are defined 
and created in the following way. The underlying data come from tax records filed by 
each firm every year and contain all employment relationships in the country during the 
year. There is an employer (workplace) indicator and an individual indicator linking this 
information to the rest of the data set.  
In addition to annual earnings (by job), data contain information on the first and last 
remunerated month. We use this information for two purposes: Firstly, we wish to iden-
tify workers who are employed within a workplace at the same time, and therefore only 
                                                 
8 The concept of “homogeneity” does not take into account the ethnicity of the residents.  
10  Age at migration and social integration  include spells covering November each year. In addition, we calculate a measure of 
wages by dividing the annual earnings from a given employer by the length of the em-
ployment spell (within the year). We only keep those individuals whose wages are at 
least 25 percent of the average janitor wage in order to get a reasonable estimate of 
wages.
9 For each individual we only keep the observation giving the highest wage 
within each year. Employment is defined as fulfilling these criteria, and wages are ana-
lyzed conditional on employment.  
Co-workers are others employed at the same workplace according to the definition 
above. The workplace exposure sample is further restricted compared to the wage sam-
ple, since individuals employed at workplaces with only one employee, as well as those 
lacking a stationary workplace (artists, freelance employees, employees doing services 
at other people’s homes etc) do not have any co-workers by definition.
10 This reduces 
the sample by approximately 10 percent. 
3.5  The marriage market 
We measure exposure at the “marriage” market by whether the subject’s spouse is for-
eign-born or native. Similarly to the analysis of wages and workplace exposure, we 
cannot measure marriage market exposure for those without a spouse. An individual’s 
spouse is defined using the following hierarchical criteria: (i) the partner in marriage if 
married; (ii) the cohabiting spouse if not married but cohabiting with common children; 
(iii) the other parent of one’s first child if living alone but having a child. Somewhat 
more than half (a quarter of) the sample is classified through the first (second) criterion.  
3.6  Education 
Our information about education is based on register data on the highest achieved level 
of education. This data is collected from Swedish schools and colleges at all levels in 
the education system. We impute years of schooling based on this information (the val-
ues for assigning years of education are available on request). 
                                                 
9 Skans et al (2009) use a similar procedure and show that the ensuing wage distribution is very similar to the actual 
distribution of monthly wages. The information on janitor wages are drawn from various publications by Statistics 
Sweden, detailed information is available upon request. 
10 The workplace indicators are defined from physical addresses of where people do the major part of their work. 
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Here we present a general description of the population under study. Table B 1 in the 
appendix gives some descriptive statistics on the sibling sample. The average years of 
parental schooling is below 10,
11 which highlights the fact that the included individuals 
are to a large extent part of great wave of relatively low-qualified labor migrants who 
came to Sweden from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. This is also evident in the 
source country composition. Nordic migrants make up 60 percent of the sample, and 
within this group Finland constitutes 85 percent. Yugoslavia, Turkey, Germany and 
“Southern Europe” (i.e. Italy and Greece to a large extent) are other groups of signifi-
cant size. It is thus worth noting that the sampling frame precedes the major flows from 
the Middle East beginning in the mid 1980s. 
4.1  Is there segregation?  
A natural starting point is to ask to what extent there is segregation in the studied mar-
kets. Table 1 shows data for four populations: Natives with native parents, natives with 
foreign-born parents (arriving less than 10 years before birth), immigrants arriving be-
fore age 15, and immigrants arriving later. The two intermediate populations together 
make up our population of interest. All statistics are measured as averages at ages 31–
34.  
The table is quite informative about the situation for immigrants in Sweden. First, we 
see that the average level of education among immigrants, and children of immigrants, 
is similar to that of natives, a fact which is well-known from previous studies. Second, 
labor market performance is somewhat poorer among natives with foreign-born parents 
than among other natives, and a lot poorer among the foreign-born. Third, there are 
large immigrant-native differences in the degree of exposure to immigrants on all three 
markets. Note that people of different origin would be randomly allocated in all dimen-
sions if immigrant background played no role.  
                                                 
11 The fraction with missing information on parental education is high, but less of a concern given that the baseline 
analysis employs family fixed effects and does thus not use parental education as a control variable. 
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Table 1 Outcomes in different markets and groups (individuals born 1960-1971). 
    Used sample   











      
Education (years)  12.17  11.91  11.43  11.83 
Employment (%)  79  74                             66  46 
Log Wage  9.56  9.58  9.45  9.35 
        
Exposure to immigrants (%):      
Workplace   8  14  18  28 
Residential   12  17  21  29 
Marriage 7  18  39  73 
        
N 1,254,026  32,802  42,855  156,638 
Note: Residential exposure is the fraction of neighbors that are foreign-born, workplace exposure is the fraction of 
co-workers that are foreign-born and Marriage exposure is the fraction of spouses that are foreign-born. For details on 
definitions, see the data section. Note that those who immigrated after age 15 may have spent substantially shorter 
time in Sweden at the time of observation. 
 
This means that immigrants and natives would on average be equally exposed to 
people of immigrant (and native) background unless there is some systematic sorting.
12 
Thus, the fact that we see more immigrant exposure among those with an immigrant 
background is evidence of segregation.
13 The level of segregation is not only strong but 
also seemingly increasing in age at migration. Those with “foreign background” have 
more immigrants among their colleagues and neighbors, and do more often marry im-
migrants.
14 The magnitudes are quite striking: those that immigrated as youths are more 
than twice as likely (39 percent) to have an immigrant spouse as those born in Sweden 
                                                 
12 Note that the size of the average unit does not matter for this argument. The fact that marriages contain fewer 
individuals than a workplace or a neighborhood is thus not a concern. For example, let there be 10 percent 
immigrants in a country (and for simplicity think of this fraction as uniform across the age distribution). Then we 
would expect each person (independent of origin) to pick an immigrant spouse with a 10 percent probability. 
Likewise he or she would “pick” an immigrant co-worker and an immigrant neighbor respectively with a 10 percent 
probability. Therefore we would find that both people with and without an immigrant background have (on average) 
10 percent immigrants among their spouses, co-workers and neighbors. 
13 See Åslund and Skans (2008) for a further discussion on comparisons between random and actual allocation 
distributions in a similar setting. 
14 Note that the extremely high rate of mating with immigrants among those arriving after age 15 is likely to be driven 
by couples arriving together. 
Age at migration and social integration  13 with two foreign born parents (18 percent).  Compared to natives with two native par-
ents, immigrant youths are more than 5 times as likely to marry an immigrant.  
4.2  Correlations between different integration measures 
In order to interpret our results, it is important that we understand how the three markets 
interact. If, for example, the segregation measures for the three social markets are per-
fectly correlated, it is not meaningful to analyze them separately. Table 2 shows correla-
tions between the outcomes using both raw data and after removing family fixed effects. 
All statistics are based on the sample of siblings whose families arrived when they were 
aged –10 to 14, i.e. the sample that will be used in the empirical analysis below. 
 
Table 2 The correlation between the outcome measures. 
 Overall  correlations   
  Ed Em Wa  W  R  M 
Economic out-
comes 
      
Education  (Ed) 1 -- -- -- -- -- 
Empl.  (Em)  0.09 1 -- -- -- -- 
Log  Wage  (Wa)  0.24  n.a. 1 -- -- -- 
       
Exposure       
Workplace(W) –0.16  n.a.  –0.14 1 -- -- 
Residential  (R) –0.15 –0.11 –0.08  0.34  1  -- 
Marriage  (M) –0.10 –0.10 –0.12  0.29  0.39  1 
       
 Within-family  correlations   
  Ed Em Wa  W  R  M 
Economic out-
comes 
      
Education  (Ed) 1 -- -- -- -- -- 
Empl.  (Em)  0.08 1 -- -- -- -- 
Log  Wage  (Wa)  0.13  n.a. 1 -- -- -- 
       
Exposure       
Workplace(W) –0.09  n.a.  –0.09 1 -- -- 
Residential  (R) –0.06 –0.09 –0.04  0.14  1  -- 
Marriage  (M) –0.02 –0.10 –0.08  0.12  0.18  1 
Note: Data are for immigrants with two foreign born parents with siblings in the data. Samples 
sizes (available upon request) differ since the correlations are based on pair-wise comparisons of 
all pairs where we have data on both indicators.
 
14  Age at migration and social integration  We find a negative correlation between economic outcomes and the social integra-
tion measures. Youths with more immigrants neighbors, coworkers and spouses have 
poorer economic and educational outcomes on average. This association is partly, but 
not fully, explained by the family fixed effects (lower panel).  
Interestingly, we find relatively modest correlations between the measures of resi-
dential exposure, workplace exposure, and marriage market exposure. The correlation 
coefficients are in the order of 0.3 and within families (i.e. the variation primarily used 
in the empirical analysis) it is less than 0.2 in all cases. In other words, people may be 
much more integrated in one dimension than in another. 
5  The empirical setup 
Here we set up an empirical model for estimating the impact of age at migration on out-
comes at adulthood measured at a fixed age (in our case the early 30s). We define indi-
vidual i:s age at migration as the family’s (j) year of arrival (C) minus the year of birth. 
As explained in the data section we use data where the family arrived between 10 years 
before and 14 years after the birth. Thus:  
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where   is the outcome of individual i belonging to family j. The outcome de-
pends on a dummy variable for each possible age at migration (Age) except age 0 which 
serves as a reference point. 
) (i ij y
β  is the corresponding vector of parameters, one for each 
age at migration. The model also accounts for effects from the calendar year of immi-
gration C and the year of observation T. Retrieving consistent estimates of the β :s 
Age at migration and social integration  15 poses two challenges. First, as standard in the literature (see e.g. Borjas, 1999), we face 
a perfect linear dependency between age, cohort, and observation year.
15 Second, we 
need to deal with the impact of potentially important unobserved heterogeneity. OLS-
estimates will confuse the impact of age at migration with an effect coming directly 
from the parents if e.g. parents who are particularly devoted to the success of their chil-
dren adjust the timing of migration to the “optimal” age of the children. It is plausible 
that families who arrive with 14-year-old children are fundamentally different from 
those who arrive with small children, or those who give birth to their children when al-
ready in the host country. Similarly, both the timing of when to have children among 
those who already migrated and return-migration choices may be influenced by the so-
cial and economic integration into the host country.
16  
In order to address these problems we first include family-specific fixed effects   
to handle unobserved heterogeneity. This means that we remove the impact of endogen-
ous in- and out migration as well as effects on the timing of child births as long as these 
are driven by factors at the family (rather than child) level.
j α
17  
Since year of arrival does not vary within families (by construction), this variable 
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Since outcomes are observed at a common age, the variation in age at immigration 
and time of observation is identical for siblings. This means that when including the 
family fixed effects, we have a perfect multicollinearity between age at migration and 
time of observation. A frequently used strategy to deal with this issue in the assimilation 
                                                 
15 As is seen by replacing Year of birth in equation (1) by Year of outcome (T) minus “Age at outcome” where the 
latter is fixed by construction. Note though that the problem cannot be solved by looking at multiple outcome years. 
16 One could interpret higher fertility rates after immigration as indicative of selection, although they are commonly 
seen as a “disruption effect” in the demographic literature. See Mayer & Riphahn (2000) for a general discussion on 
economic and demographic models and empirical studies of fertility among immigrant women, and Andersson (2004) 
for Swedish evidence. 
17 The first paper to use this strategy to isolate the effects of age at migration was Böhlmark (2008), who studied 
schooling outcomes. Van den Berg et al (2009) use a similar approach in their study of the relationship between age 
at migration and height at adulthood. Both of these papers are based on Swedish data. 
16  Age at migration and social integration  literature is to assume that observation time effects are the same for immigrants and na-
tives. This approach is less appealing when studying social segregation (since the time-
effects are likely to differ between immigrants and natives) and has also been ques-
tioned for economic outcomes by e.g. Barth et al (2004, 2006). 
In order to handle the effects of outcome years we instead assume that differences in 
unobserved heterogeneity among age-0 migrants across birth cohorts are not syste-
matically related to the age structure of the cohort. Under this assumption we can de-
rive consistent estimates through the following transformation: First we calculate the 
average outcome among same-aged immigrants who arrived at age 0 by observation 
year (and source region). Then we transform the data by deducting this average from the 
individual outcome. Formally, we deduct: 
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Equation (5) shows that identification holds as long as the composition (in terms of 
e.g. the propensity for segregation) of immigrants arriving at age 0 in different cohorts 
is uncorrelated with age at immigration within families. A sufficient condition for this 
to hold is that the composition of age 0 immigrants is the same in all cohorts. We be-
lieve that this assumption is relatively innocuous relative to the alternatives presented in 
the existing literature, especially considering that the between-year differences of equa-
tion (4) are identified from individuals who immigrated in the period 1960–1971 when 
labor migration consistently dominated the migrant inflow to Sweden. 
Age at migration and social integration  17 The baseline strategy is thus to estimate (5) explaining the transformed outcome by 
age at migration in a family fixed effects model. Thus identification of β  comes from 
differences between siblings in their age at the time when their parents immigrated. We 
augment this specification by including an indicator for whether the subject is a first-
born child, and a gender dummy.
18 
To check the robustness of our results we also estimate equation (2) directly but ig-
nore arrival cohort dummies. This model thus explains the outcomes as measured before 
the transformation and includes observation-time dummies instead of family fixed ef-
fects. In this specification we also control for mother’s and father’s education, mother’s 
region of origin interacted with dummies for observation year, gender and the first-born 
indicator in order to capture heterogeneity as best we can. The assumptions then are: (i) 
that the included covariates capture selection on the timing of migration; (ii) that there 
are no effects of year of immigration conditional on the included covariates.  
We will present models capturing age at migration (years) in two different ways: (i) 
as dummies; (ii) using a spline function where the impact is assumed to be linear but 
where the slope is allowed to change at age 0. Specification (i) is more flexible, whereas 
(ii) gives more precision and facilitates interpretation. We return to this issue below. 
6  Results 
6.1  Baseline estimates—family fixed effects 
Figure 1 shows semi-parametric estimates from the family fixed effects specifications 
discussed in section 5. We impose no functional form on the pattern of how age at mi-
gration affects segregation and economic outcomes. In all cases we use immigration at 
the year of birth as the baseline. Starting in the upper panel of the figure, we see a ten-
dency towards a negative relationship between age at migration and completed educa-
tion. However, the standard errors of the flexible specification are large. For employ-
ment there appears to be a negative slope among those born outside Sweden (and thus 
                                                 
18 See e.g. Black et al (2005) and Åslund and Grönqvist (2009) for empirical evidence of birth order effects. 
18  Age at migration and social integration  immigrated after age 0), but the estimates are significant only after age 6–7. The wage 
specification exhibits no significant impact from age at migration. 
The slopes change when we turn to the social segregation measures in the second 
row of the figure. Workplace, neighborhood and marriage exposure all increase with 
age at migration. The relationship is particularly strong among the foreign-born, but 
also appears to be present among those born in Sweden. This suggests that there is inhe-
ritance in the integration process; the “capital” (broadly defined) acquired by parents be-














































































Figure 1 The relationship between age at migration and outcomes – semiparametric 
estimates 
Notes: Estimates and 95% confidence intervals from family fixed effects specifications described in sec-
tion 2.3. The employment probability and workplace, residential and marriage exposure are measured at 
the scale 0 to 100. Education is years of schooling. Wage is 100 times log(monthly wage).  
 
In order to gain precision we have estimated a more restrictive model presented in 
Table 3. Since the relationships in Figure 1 appear very close to linear in the pre-birth 
and post-birth intervals respectively we define a functional form with two separate li-
Age at migration and social integration  19 near segments divided by a spline at age 0. It is not obvious that the slope actually 
changes at age 0 in all specifications and Table 3 therefore also reports P-values from 
tests of the equivalence of pre- and post-birth slope parameters.  
The table shows that there are statistically significant relationships between age at 
migration for the foreign-born for all outcomes except wages. The estimates for educa-
tion are moderate; arriving 10 years later decreases expected education by 0.2 years. 
This is a small effect compared to results found in e.g. van Ours & Veenman (2006) but 
in the vicinity of previous Swedish evidence presented in Böhlmark (2009). Interes-
tingly, we find similar effects for children born in Sweden depending on how long the 
parents have resided in Sweden, suggesting that parental integration is an important 
channel for furthering educational attainment among immigrant youths.  
Increasing age at arrival by 10 years gives 6 percentage points lower employment 
probability among the foreign-born, but there is no effect of parental time in the host 
country. We find no evidence of wage effects in either interval. 
The estimated effects on the exposure measures are all substantial. An individual ar-
riving 10 years later have about 4 percentage points higher share of immigrants at the 
workplace as well as in the neighborhood. Compared to the sample means of 16 and 19 
percent respectively, this is a large impact. The marriage market effects are even larger: 
arriving at age 10 instead of age 0 almost doubles the probability of marrying an immi-
grant instead of a native. Interestingly, this means that the within-family differences de-
pending on age at migration are in the order of the descriptive differences presented in 
Table 1 above.  
We have also investigated the “participation effects” in the marriage market from age 
at migration; arriving 1 year later increases the probability of having a spouse by about 
1 percentage point, which should be related to the average marriage rate of 31 percent.
19 
This means that the absolute number of marriages between immigrants increases even 
more with immigration age than what is revealed by the estimates shown in Table 3. 
The estimated effects of family time spent in the host country before birth for child-
ren of immigrants are highly significant for all the social segregation outcomes. The 
20  Age at migration and social integration  size of the estimates is about half that of the estimates for time spent in the country by 
childhood immigrants. The p-values for a test of slope coefficients being the same for 
child migrants and children of immigrants reject the null for all three outcomes. Thus, 
taken at face value the results suggest that roughly half of the integration due to earlier 
age at migration is an effect of parental integration and half is due to individual expe-
riences. 
 
Table 3 The impact of one year higher age at migration. 
 EDU  EMP  WAGE  WORK  RESID  MARR 
AoM  (0,14)  –.019**  –0.593**  –.003 .495** .416**  2.382** 
  (.006)  (0.135) (.002) (.082) (.047)  (0.175) 
AoM  (–10,0)  –.021** –0.214  –.002 .235** .201**  0.961** 
  (.007)  (0.155)  (.002) (.076) (.046)  (0.206) 
Observations  47,625 47,890 36,753 32,696 47,890 29,685 
R-squared  .64 .52 .57 .59 .68  0.61 
Same slope (p-val)  .840  .045  .897  .011  .000  0.000 
Family fixed ef-
fects  19,997 20,096 15,891 14,303 20,096 
 
12,760 
Df  27,624 27,790 20,858 18,389 27,790  16921 
Mean  Dep  Var  11.52 69  9.50 16 19 31 
Notes: Estimates from sibling regressions including family fixed effects; see 2.3 for further descrip-
tion. AoM (–10,0) and AoM (0,14) indicate the coefficients on age at migration in the respective in-
tervals. “EDU” is imputed years of schooling; “EMP” is employment; “WAGE” is log(monthly 
wage); “WORK”, “RESID” and “MARR” are immigrant exposure in the workplace, residential and 
marriage markets. The employment probability and workplace, residential and marriage exposure are 
measured at the scale 0 to 100. The outcome variables are described and defined in section 3. * (**) 
Statistically significant at the 5(1) percent level. 
 
6.2  Alternative specifications 
As discussed in section 2.3 an alternative way of approaching the methodological prob-
lems is to parameterize the effects of family background (i.e. to control for e.g. parental 
education and country of origin) instead of using family fixed effects. This specification 
provides the opportunity to control for observation year effects directly, provided that 
one is willing to assume that conditional on the included covariates and observation 
                                                                                                                                               
19 The corresponding coefficients (standard errors) on the probability to be married are 0.92 (0.19) for AoM (–10,0) 
and 1.21 (0.15) for AoM (0,14). 
Age at migration and social integration  21 year, there is no bias due to a correlation between age at migration and unobserved 
background characteristics and/or immigration year. 
Figure B 1 and Table B 2 in Appendix B present results based on this alternative ap-
proach. The results correspond to those in Figure 1 and Table 3. We see first of all that 
the OLS estimates for the sibling sample are very similar to those of the full sample 
which we interpret as the sibling sample being representative for immigrant youth in 
general. It is also evident that the (0,14) coefficients are reasonably similar to the family 
fixed effects estimates presented in Table 3. However, the estimated exposure effects 
are much smaller (and insignificant for residential segregation) in the (-10,0) interval 
when family fixed effects are left out. This suggest that parents who are more “prone” to 
segregation on average spend a longer time in the host country before giving birth. It is 
reasonable that parents who have a (sometimes never realized) wish to return the coun-
try of origin wait longer before giving birth and have stronger preferences for living 
with other immigrants. If children inherit these preferences from their parents we would 
expect a bias in the observed direction. Another alternative is that people do not have 
children until their economic situation is sufficiently stable. If a tendency to live and 
work with immigrants is correlated with (or caused by) labor market potential, we 
would also see this pattern. Furthermore, the family fixed effects capture immigration 
cohort effects which might also bias the OLS results.  
We have also experimented with further alternatives for controlling for observation 
time effects in the sibling segregation analysis.
20 Controlling for the pool of countrymen 
gives similar patterns for workplace and residential exposure, and including controls for 
the number of other-sex countrymen does not alter the patterns for the marriage results. 
All results are also robust to including only siblings who are born not more than five 
years apart. 
                                                 
20 It is worth noting that using the standard approach from the assimilation literature where native outcomes are used 
to handle calendar time effects is not appropriate in our setting. For example, birth cohort differences (1960–71) in 
education are not as strong in the immigrant sample as they are among same-aged natives. This means that had we 
used the overall trend in education to correct for observation time differences, we would have underestimated the 
effect of age at migration (since older siblings perform better relative to natives than do younger siblings). 
22  Age at migration and social integration  6.3  Heterogeneous effects and variations 
Table 4 displays estimates from sibling models where the effects of age at migration are 
allowed to vary between men and women. The results suggest that labor market inte-
gration among foreign-born males is substantially more affected by age at migration 
than what is the case for the female counterparts. We find a significant negative wage 
effect for males. The differences between men and women in effects in the (0,14) inter-
val on employment, wages and workplace exposure are all statistically significant.  
 
Table 4 Heterogeneous effects: gender 
 EDU EMP WAGE WORK RESID  MARR
Men AoM (0,14)  –.015* -0.705** –.009** .647** .450** 2.470**
  (.006) (0.147) (.002) (.092) (.051) (.193)
Men AoM (-10,0)  –.016+ -0.366* –.002 .238** .197** .604*
  (.008) (0.178) (.002) (.088) (.053) (.243)
   
Women AoM (0,14)  –.023** -0.472** .004* .327** .380** 2.304**
  (.006) (0.150) (.002) (.091) (.052) (.190)
Women AoM (-10,0)  –.025** -0.046 –.003 .222* .205** 1.291**
  (.009) (0.189) (.002) (.091) (.054) (.245)
Observations  47,625 47,890 36,753 32,696 47,890 29,685
R–squared  .64 .52 .58 .60 .68 .61
P(same slope for men)  .871 .139 .022 .001 .001 .000
P(same slope for women)  .861 .078 .029 .417 .018 .001
P(same slope for women and 
men in AoM (0,14) interval) 
.108 .061 .000 .000 .106 .291
P(same slope for women and 
men in AoM (-10,0) interval) 
.332 .105 .725 .871 .886 .009
Family fixed effects  19,997 20,096 15,891 14,303 20,096 12,760
Df  27,622 27,788 20,856 18,387 27,788 16,919
Mean Dep Var, Men  1 1 . 4 37 3 9 . 6 51 72 0  2 6
Mean Dep Var, Women  1 1 . 6 16 5 9 . 3 31 51 9  3 4
Notes: Estimates from sibling regressions including family fixed effects; see 2.3 for further description. 
AoM (–10,0) and AoM (0,14) indicate the coefficients on age at migration in the respective intervals. 
“EDU” is imputed years of schooling; “EMP” is employment; “WAGE” is log(monthly wage); 
“WORK”, “RESID” and “MARR” are immigrant exposure in the workplace, residential and marriage 
markets. The employment probability and workplace, residential and marriage exposure are measured at 
the scale 0 to 100. The outcome variables are described and defined in section 3. * (**) Statistically sig-
nificant at the 5(1) percent level. 
 
Age at migration and social integration  23 For marriages, the estimates indicate that parental time in the host country is more in-
fluential on the daughters’ choice of spouse. Interestingly, the effects are nearly identi-
cal for children who migrated themselves. This suggest that the parental influence is 
larger for females, whereas the impact of own time in the country is larger for males. 
The latter could possibly be explained by the poorer economic performance among 
males who arrive late. 
It is well known from previous research that labor market performance and social se-
gregation vary heavily depending on region of origin. People of Nordic descent tend to 
manage best in the Swedish labor market, followed by other Western migrants, whereas 
Non-Westerners experience the biggest difficulties. This does not necessarily mean that 
the effects of age at migration are larger in the latter groups. Allowing the effects to 
vary by region of origin, reveals that the impact on employment and wages is relatively 
similar across groups, whereas the negative effect on education is driven by Nordic mi-
grants. The effects on the measures of immigrant exposure are present for all groups at 
all three markets, but more pronounced for the non-western migrants.
21  
A similar exercise suggests that the impact of age at migration is more or less inde-
pendent of the mother’s level of education. Parental education does, however, affect the 
outcomes directly in the expected direction. The coefficients from the OLS estimates 
discussed above show that education, employment and wages increase with mother’s 
and father’s education, whereas the direction is the opposite for the three exposure out-
comes (i.e. segregation decreases with parental education and wages). Interestingly, the 
influence of the mother’s and father’s education is very similar except for in the mar-
riage specification, where the education of the mother is much more influential (i.e. 
children of educated mothers marry natives more often).
22 
The baseline results suggest that parental integration matters for the integration of the 
offspring. An interesting question is then to what extent parental segregation at the time 
of market entry for the subject can explain the differences according to age at migration. 
Unfortunately we cannot measure residential segregation early on in life for the child-
                                                 
21 The effects on workplace (residential; marriage) exposure in the 0-14 interval is 0.78 (0.64; 3.1) for migrants with a 
non-western origin. Detailed results are available upon request.  
24  Age at migration and social integration  ren. After restricting the number of included cohorts we have experimented with con-
trolling for the parental residential exposure when the child is aged 19 (and 25) but this 
had very little effect on the results. This suggests that differences in parents’ degree of 
integration when children are relatively old do not influence later child outcomes. 
A related issue is the possibility that the impact on social integration is channeled 
through economic outcomes and/or education, which of course requires that the 
processes at the different markets are sequential rather than simultaneous. The results 
reported above give little support to this idea since we find comparatively small effects 
on economic outcomes, but large influences on social integration. Estimating the 
exposure models with controls for individual education, employment and wages 
confirms this impression; the results change very little. 
6.4  Exposure to immigrants from different regions 
To better understand the process of integration we separate exposure to immigrants 
from the same region of origin (“own-group” exposure) from exposure to other foreign-
born (“other-group” exposure). While sorting along ethnic lines between immigrant 
groups in the residential (Bråmå 2006) and labor (Åslund & Skans 2009) markets are 
well documented, with the evidence suggesting that ethnic (own-group) sorting is more 
important on the labor market, there is little prior evidence of marriage market sorting. 
Our data show that the own-group component is the most prevalent at the marriage 
market: 19 percent of marriages are with a spouse born in the mother’s birth region, 
whereas 12 percent are with someone from another country outside Sweden. The latter 
is in fact not very far off from the 7 percent immigrant spouses we found among natives 
with native parents. Further scrutiny (see Table B 3) reveals cross-country connections 
that would be expected from linguistic and cultural ties (e.g. “South American”–Chile 
and “Middle East”–Turkey). But it is also apparent that supply matters, which is evident 
in the high fraction of marriages to Finns (the largest immigrant group) among other 
groups. 
                                                                                                                                               
22 The impact on marriage exposure is -0.012 for each year of mother’s education and -0.007 for each year of father’s 
education. Detailed results are available upon request. 
Age at migration and social integration  25 Table 5 presents estimates of how age at migration affects on own-group and other-
group exposure on each of the three markets. In the residential market, age at migration 
affects both dimensions, but relative to the sample mean the estimates are somewhat 
larger for own-group exposure. The pattern is very much dominated by effects relative 
to the own group in terms of workplace exposure, but there are also some effects in 
terms of exposure to other immigrant groups. Most strikingly however, for marriages 
we find that the entire effect of age at migration goes through the probability of finding 
a spouse from the mother’s region of birth. Age at migration has no effect at all on the 
probability of finding a spouse of other immigrant origin.  
 
Table 5 Own-group and other-group exposure: spline estimates 
  Other-group exposure  Own-group exposure 
 WORK RESID MARR WORK RESID MARR
AoM (0,14)  .140*  .315** –.015 .363** .135**  2.397**
 (.056) (.041) (.136) (.067) (.015) (.167)
AoM  (-10,0)  .056 .149** –.001 .185** .066** .962**
 (.054) (.042) (.152) (.055) (.014) (.160)
Observations 32,637 47,798 29,685 32,637 47,798 29,685
R-squared .55 .67 .52 .58 .73 .63
P(same  slope) .246 .002 .942 .024 .000 .000
Fam. fixed eff.  14,279  20,060 12,760 14,279 20,060 12,760
Df 18,354 27,734 16,921 18,354 27,734 16,921
Mean  dep  var 10 15 12 6 4 19
Notes: Estimates from sibling regressions including family fixed effects; see 2.3 for further description. 
AoM (–10,0) and AoM (0,14) indicate the coefficients on age at migration in the respective intervals. 
“Own-group” are people from the mother’s country of birth; “Other-group” are other foreign-born. 
“WORK”, “RESID” and “MARR” are immigrant exposure in the workplace, residential and marriage 
markets. The workplace, residential and marriage exposure are measured at the scale 0 to 100. The out-
come variables are described and defined in section 3. * (**) Statistically significant at the 5(1) percent 
level. 
7  Conclusions 
This paper concerns the impact of age at migration on social integration and educational 
and economic outcomes in adulthood. We quantify integration by measuring the cha-
racteristics of the people each subject is in contact with at different markets. Using pop-
ulation-wide data, which include family links, allows us to handle methodological 
problems inherent to most empirical studies of the effects of age at migration. 
26  Age at migration and social integration  Our results show that age at migration has a substantial effect on the social integra-
tion of immigrant youths. Arriving later increases the probability to live among, work 
with, and marry foreign-born individuals. These effects are also present for those whose 
parents arrived to Sweden prior to their birth. There is noteworthy heterogeneity in the 
impact of age at migration on economic outcomes. Male wages and employment are 
substantially affected, whereas there is little effect on female labor market outcomes. 
The fact that marriage patterns are the outcomes which is most strongly affected by 
parental time in the host country suggests that the social adaptation and acculturation of 
parents primarily feed onto the children’s outcomes in areas where preferences matter 
the most.  
Interestingly, the effects of age at migration on marriage patterns are similar for 
males and females who immigrated themselves, but females are much more influenced 
then males by their parent’s time in the host country before birth when studying those 
born in Sweden. Since the first of these effects is affected by both individual and family 
integration, our results suggest that female marriage patterns are relatively more af-
fected by family exposure to the host country whereas male marriage patterns are more 
affected by individual exposure to the host country.  
We also find that the higher levels of segregation among those arriving at higher ages 
primarily is driven by increased exposure to countrymen rather than exposure other 
groups of immigrants. This, again, is particularly true in the marriage market where the 
entire effect is driven by exposure to immigrants from the mother’s region of birth. 
These results suggest that being older at arrival primarily means preserving ties to the 
source country and culture, rather than strengthening the ties to the overall immigrant 
community. 
Taken together, the results show that although migrating at a higher age may not be a 
crucial determinant of long-term economic well-being, it does seem to have a very large 
influence on the composition of people the individual will interact with on many differ-
ent social arenas. This dichotomy appears particularly true for females. Furthermore, we 
find that children’s integration depends on the time spent by the families in the source 
country before their birth––integration is inherited. 
Age at migration and social integration  27 It is in this context worth noting that our study primarily covers children to economi-
cally successful labor migrants, where social segregation has not been considered a 
major problem. The present policy debate focuses on the rapidly growing numbers of 
children to non-western immigrants, whose economic outcomes are much poorer and 
where the perceived cultural differences are greater. Our findings suggest that parental 
influences and early experiences are actually more important determinants of social in-
tegration in these groups. In the formerly homogeneous countries which now experience 
an increasing ethnic diversity, it is thus essential to understand these processes for pre-
dicting how the societies will develop. 
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Region Countries  included 
Sweden  0-Sweden 
Nordic  1-Finland  
  2-Denmark  
  3-Norway+ Iceland 
Western Europe  
and North America 
4-GB + Ireland  
5-Germany 
  6-Mediterr. Europe (Greece + Italy + Spain + Portugal + the Vatican + Monaco + Malta + 
San Marino) 
  7-Other Europe (Andorra + Belgium + France + Liechtenstein + Luxemburg + the 
Netherlands + Switzerland + Austria) 
  8-US + Canada 
Eastern Europe  9-Bosnia-Herzegovina 
  10-Former Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia + Croatia + Macedonia + Slovenia) 
  11-Poland 
  12-The Baltic states (Estonia + Latvia  + Lithuania) 
  13-Eastern Europe 1 (Rumania + The former USSR + Bulgaria + Albania) 
  14-Eastern Europe 2 (Hungary  + The former Czechoslovakia) 
The rest of the world  15-Mexico and Central America 
  16-Chile  
  17-Other South America (Argentina + Bolivia + Peru + Colombia + Uruguay + Ecuador + 
Guyana + Paraguay + Surinam + Venezuela) 
  18-African Horn (Ethiopia + Somalia  +Sudan + Djibouti),  
  19- North Africa + Middle East (Lebanon + Syria + Morocco + Tunisia + Egypt + Algeria + 
Israel + Palestine + Jordan + South Yemen + Yemen + the United Arab Emirates + Kuwait 
+ Bahrain + Qatar + Saudi Arabia + Cyprus) 
  20- Other African (all African countries not included elsewhere)  
  21-Iran 
  22-Iraq  
  23-Turkey 
  24-East Asia (Japan + China + Korea + Hong Kong + Taiwan)  
  25-Southeast Asia (Vietnam + Thailand + the Philippines + Malaysia + Laos + Burma + 
Indonesia +  Singapore)  
  26-Other Asia (Sri Lanka + Bangladesh + India + Afghanistan + Pakistan + Brunei + Bhutan 
+ Kampuchea + the Maldives + Mongolia + Nepal + Oman + Sikkim) 
  27-Oceania (Australia + New Zealand etc…) 
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supplementary estimates 
Table B 1 Description of the sibling sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max
Year of birth  47,890 1965.5 3.216 1960 1971
Immigration year  47,890 1967.2 5.895 1950 1984
Age at migration  47,890 1.742 5.675 -10 14
Female  47,890 .487 .500 0 1
Oldest  47,890 .328 .470 0 1
Mother’s schooling  40,279 9.707 2.085 8 19
Father’s schooling  31,584 9.889 2.271 8 19
Mother’s schooling 




missing   47,890 .340 .473
 
0 1
       
Origin:       
Finland  47,890        .561        .496                     0                      1   
Other Nordic  47,890        .094        .292                     0                      1 
Germany  47,890        .037        .189                     0                      1   
Western Europe  47,890        .017        .129                     0                      1 
Turkey  47,890        .053        .225                     0                      1  
Eastern Europe  47,890        .037        .188                     0                       1   
Yugoslavia  47,890        .010        .300                     0                      1 
Southern Europe  47,890        .039        .193                     0                       1   
Rest of the world  47,890        .061        .240                     0                      1   
Outcomes:   
Education  47,625 11.52 1.963 8 19
Employment  47,890 69.3 38.0 0 1
Log Wage  36,753 9.498 .473 7.923 12.023
Workplace  32,696 16.1 18.3 0 100
Residential  47,890 19.5 15.1 0 95.6
Marriage  29,685 30.6 46.1 0 100
Notes: Values are for the sibling sample included in the ”Residential” estimations, i.e. the sample with 










































































Figure B 1 Semi-parametric OLS-estimates 
Notes: Results corresponding to those presented in Figure 1, but estimated using the alternative 
approach described in section 5. 
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Table B 2 Linear OLS estimates (cf. Table 3) 
 EDU EMP  WAGE WORK RESID MARR 
 Sibling  sample 
AoM (0,14)  –.035** –0.474**  –.004** .515** .440** 1.801** 
  (.003) (0.063)  (.001) (.038) (.024) (.088) 
AoM (-10,0)  –.047** –0.382**  –.006** .078* .022 .322** 
  (.004) (0.085)  (.001) (.039) (.027) (.111) 
Observations  47,625 47,890 36,753 32,696 47,890 29,685 
R-squared  .12 .05 .22 .12 .19 .27 
P(same slope)  .060 .570 .386 .000 .000 .000 
Df  47,379 47,644 36,508 32,452 47,644 29,437 
Mean dep var  11.518 69.3  9.498 16.118 19.489 30.561 
     
 Full  sample 
AoM (0,14)  –.033** –0.481**  –.005** .510** .418** 1.870** 
  (.002) (0.047)  (.001) (.027) (.018) (.062) 
AoM (-10,0)  –.045** –0.302**  –.004** .040 .036 .259** 
  (.003) (0.066)  (.001) (.029) (.020) (.078) 
Observations  74,029 74,335 62,591 58,351 74,334 54,086 
R-squared  .12 .05 .22 .11 .17 .23 
P(same slope)  .020 .243 .207 .000 .000 .000 
Df  73781 74087 62344 58104 74086 53834 
Mean dep var  11.648 69.5  9.510 16.149 19.327 29.350 
Notes: Cross-sectional estimates (standard errors). Upper panel uses sibling sample (cf 
Table 3), lower panel includes all individuals in the 1960-71 birth cohorts immigrating 
in the age interval [–10, 14]. * (**) Statistically significant at the 5(1) percent level. Table B 3 Cross-ethnic marriage patterns 
  Mother’s region of birth 
Spouse region of 
birth  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)  (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) 
(a) Finland  67.2  15.8 19.0 2.1 4.6 17.8 4.0 9.3  9.4 4.5 2.7 1.0 0.5 1.9 0.3 0.5 
(b) Denmark  1.5  29.1 3.7 1.4 3.9 6.5 0.8 2.0  3.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.5 
(c) Norway + Iceland  2.8  6.7 27.2 0.5 1.4 7.9 0.7 0.7  4.9 1.0 1.6 0.2 0.1 1.2 1.0 
(d) Fm Yugoslavia  1.8  5.5 3.4 76.1 3.9 5.6 3.5 13.2  8.8 1.2 3.3 0.6 0.1 0.5 
(e) Poland  1.1  4.2 3.7 1.2 61.5 5.1 1.4 20.5  3.6 1.2 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3  
(f) Germany  1.1  1.2 1.9 0.7 1.4 12.1 3.6 1.3  2.6 0.2 1.1 2.2 0.5 
(g) Mediterranean 
Europe 2.2  3.6 3.4 1.6 2.8 7.0 71.2 4.0 3.3 2.4 4.9 0.6 0.6 1.2 0.5 
(h) South East Europe  0.7  2.1 0.4 1.3 1.6 1.9 1.7 23.8  3.6 1.4 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.5 
(i) Central Eastern 
Europe 0.6  1.8 1.1 1.3 1.4 3.3 0.8 3.3  37.5 0.4 0.1 0.6  
(j) Chile  2.5  3.3 2.6 0.7 1.6 2.8 1.9 1.3  0.7 65.4 27.3 1.4 0.1 0.6 1.9  
(k) South America  1.5  2.4 4.9 1.1 0.5 2.3 1.1 1.3  2.3 9.7 43.2 0.8 0.2 0.5 
(l) M East + N Afr  2.8  2.1 3.4 1.1 1.4 5.1 1.9 4.0  2.9 1.6 1.6 73.2 16.9 0.3  
(m) Turkey  1.0  1.8 1.9 1.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 3.3  1.3 1.0 12.5 76.1 0.6 1.0 3.1 
(n) East Asia  0.9  0.6 1.9 0.0 0.7 2.8 0.3   1.0 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.0 52.5 8.4 1.5 
(o) SE Asia  2.6  3.9 4.5 0.5 1.1 2.8 0.4 0.7  0.7 1.2 0.6 0.1 22.8 76.0 8.2 
(p) Other Asia  0.8  1.5 0.7 0.2 0.5 1.9 0.3 0.7  0.7 0.2 0.5 0.1 2.5 4.5 74.7 
Notes: The table shows fractions of marriages with non-natives by mother’s region of birth and spouse’s birth region. The samples are restricted to regions 
where we observe at least 100 marriages. To save space, the same restriction is used for spouse’s birth region. 
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